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We document two new findings about the industry-level response to minimum wage hikes. First, restaurant
exit and entry both rise following a hike. Second, there is no change in employment among continuing restaurants.
We develop a model of industry dynamics based on putty-clay technology that is consistent with these findings.
In the model, continuing restaurants cannot change employment, and thus industry-level adjustment occurs
gradually through exit of labor-intensive restaurants and entry of capital-intensive restaurants. Interestingly, the
putty-clay model matches the small estimated short-run disemployment effect of the minimum wage found in
other studies, but produces a larger long-run disemployment effect.
1. INTRODUCTION
This article presents new evidence on how the restaurant industry, the largest U.S. employer
of low-wage labor, responds to minimumwage hikes. We document two new empirical findings.
First, exit and entry among limited service (LS) (i.e., fast food) restaurants rise after a mini-
mum wage hike. Second, there is no change in employment among continuing LS restaurants.
Together, these results imply an economically small impact on employment two years after a
minimum wage hike. We show that an augmented putty-clay model explains these responses.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide microlevel evidence supportive of the
importance of putty-clay relative to competing models of firm dynamics.
Our empirical findings are derived from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
(QCEW), a database used to compile unemployment insurancepayroll records collectedby each
state’s employment office. The QCEW provides detailed information on each establishment’s
name, location, and employment level at a monthly frequency. We follow Card and Krueger
(1994),Addison et al. (2009), andDubeet al. (2010), amongothers, and compare restaurants that
reside in counties near state borderswhere theminimumwagehas risen onone side of the border
but not the other. Our results suggest that exit and entry, particularly among chains, increase
in the year following a minimum wage hike. By contrast, we find no comparable exit or entry
effect among full service (FS) restaurants and mixed evidence among other accommodation
and food service industries, both of which make less use of low-wage labor.
∗Manuscript received October 2015; revised June 2016.
1 We thank the editor Guido Menzio, the referees, Charles Brown, Jediphi Cabal, Jeff Campbell, Arindrajit Dube,
Jason Faberman, David Green, Andrew Jordan, Walter Oi, and participants at the AEA, RES, and SOLE meetings,
ENSAIEconomicDays, Econometric SocietyWorldCongress, BarcelonaGSESummerForumWorkshop in Structural
Microeconometrics, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the Graduate Institute Geneva, the University of Michigan,
Cambridge, Conference on Markets with Search Frictions at Sandbjerg, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Briq
Conference on Inequality at Bonn. We also thank Jess Helfand and Mike Lobue for help with the data. This research
was conducted with restricted access to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. The views expressed here do not
necessarily reflect the views of the BLS, the U.S. government, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, or the Federal
Reserve System.Please address correspondence to:Eric French,Department ofEconomics,UniversityCollegeLondon,
Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, U.K. E-mail: eric.french.econ@gmail.com.
51
C© (2017) The Authors. International Economic Review published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of University of
Pennsylvania and Osaka University
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
52 AARONSON ET AL.
To interpret these findings, we describe a model of industry dynamics that extends the
putty-clay framework of Sorkin (2015) and Gourio (2011) to incorporate endogenous exit
as in Campbell (1998). In the model, new entrants can choose from a menu of capital–labor
intensities but, once the establishment is built, output is Leontief between capital and labor. In
this environment, adjusting the capital–labor mix in response to higher wages requires shutting
down labor-intensive establishments and opening capital-intensive establishments. Hence, the
model predicts that, given reasonable parameters, both entry and exit rise in response to a
minimum wage hike.
Not only does the putty-clay model match our new empirical findings on exit and entry, but it
generates three other predictions that appear consistentwith theminimumwage literature. First,
the model implies that the costs of higher minimum wages are fully passed onto consumers in
the form of higher prices (Aaronson, 2001; Aaronson et al., 2008; Harasztosi and Lindner, 2015).
Second, despite the pass-through, profits and firm value among incumbent restaurants falls, as
in Draca et al. (2011) and Bell andMachin (2016). Third, because continuing restaurants cannot
adjust their employment levels, the putty-clay model generates a small short-run employment
response, consistent with much of the literature.
A key implication of the model is that the short- and long-run effects of minimum wage
hikes are different. In the putty-clay model, the disemployment effect of the minimum wage
hike grows over time, as labor-intensive incumbent restaurants are slowly replaced with more
capital-intensive entrants. Thus, the empirical assessment in the literature that the short-run
disemployment effects of minimum wage hikes are small may provide an imperfect guide to
the longer run effects of minimum wage hikes. Specifically, relative to what is typically inferred
from existing work, alternative minimum wage policies may have more negative employment
consequences and be a less effective redistributive tool.
This article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briefly review the relevant theoretical and
empirical literatures and argue that benchmark models of industry dynamics, as well as models
incorporating imperfect competition in labor markets, are unable to fully explain the facts that
we present on exit, entry, and employment after a minimum wage hike. Sections 3–5 describe
the QCEW data, the estimation strategy, and the empirical results. In Section 6, we present the
putty-clay model, which is used in Section 7 to show how aminimumwage hike impacts exit and
entry.A calibration of themodel is presented in Section 8,whichweuse to discuss the plausibility
of the model and the long-term consequences of minimum wage hikes. Section 9 concludes.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Putty-clay models have been effective at matching aggregate business cycle (Atkeson and
Kehoe, 1999;Gilchrist andWilliams, 2000) andfinancialmarket (Gourio, 2011) facts in a number
of settings.2 Our results complement earlier research by documenting that firm entry and exit
decisions are consistent with the predictions of putty-clay models. As such, we believe that we
are the first to provide establishment-level empirical evidence supportive of the relevance of
putty-clay technology.
The key feature of the putty-clay model—that potential entrants are able to pick a capital–
labor ratio that is well suited to the minimumwage, whereas incumbents are not—is not present
in several benchmark models typically used to describe industry dynamics or the impact of min-
imum wage hikes. For example, Hopenhayn (1992) assumes that factor proportions can freely
change. Thus, hismodel predicts an increase in exit and a fall in entry after aminimumwagehike.
Search models contain a mechanism that can potentially match our entry and exit results. In
Flinn (2006), aminimumwage hike causes the lowest productivitymatches to break up, generat-
ing a spike in firm exit. Additional exit increases the number of job searchers, potentially raising
2 Adjustment cost and job search models can match many of the same facts. But putty-clay has been able to better
match both short- and long-run responses to cost shocks such as energy price shocks, whereas adjustment cost models
that match short-run movements tend to overstate responses in the long run (Atkeson and Kehoe, 1999).
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the return to posting a vacancy and thus potentially causing a spike in firm entry. That said,
because Flinn (2006) is solved in steady state, as is standard in the literature, his model does not
distinguish between entry and exit. Furthermore, Flinn’smodel does not speak to our continuing
firm results because it is a model of a firm vacancy and a single potential worker. Models with
multiple worker firms, as in Elsby andMichaels (2013) or Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014), could
likely match our exit results but not the lack of employment change among continuing firms.3
Thus, we believe that putty-clay is a key part of any explanation of the industry dynamics that
we empirically document.4
Our article also adds to the voluminous literature on the employment effects of the minimum
wage, surveyed by Neumark and Wascher (2008).5 In particular, we believe that we are among
the first (see also Rohlin, 2011) to estimate the firm entry and exit responses to minimum wage
hikes.6 Estimation of these responses provides clearer tests of models of low-wage labor market
structure, which is critical for evaluating labor market policies to help the poor. Moreover, we
show that the putty-clay model is consistent with other market responses to minimum wage
hikes that have been studied in the literature, including higher price levels (e.g., Aaronson,
2001; Aaronson et al., 2008; Basker and Khan, 2013; Harasztosi and Lindner, 2015), lower
profits (Draca et al., 2011) and firm values (Bell and Machin, 2016), and larger disemployment
in the long run than the short run (Baker et al., 1999; Meer and West, 2015; Sorkin, 2015).
Our findings also complement recent work that finds a reduction in hiring and separations
after a minimum wage hike (Brochu and Green, 2013; Gittings and Schmutte, 2014; Dube
et al., 2016). Our results imply that minimum wage hikes increase firm turnover, whereas their
results suggest that worker turnover declines among firms that neither enter nor exit following
a minimum wage hike. Nevertheless, we see these results as potentially complementary to ours
in that each suggests important dynamic dimensions, either within or across establishments, in
which there are responses to a labor cost shock.7
The only article we are aware of that simultaneously studies exit and entry in response to
a minimum wage increase in the United States is Rohlin (2011). Using detailed firm locations
derived from the Dun and Bradstreet Marketplace data files, he finds that state minimum wage
hikes instituted between 2003 and 2006 discouraged firm entry but had little impact on the
exit and employment of establishments in existence at least four years prior. Rohlin identifies
exit, entry, and employment effects within miles of state borders, instead of at the coarser
county level that we use. However, his main results are reported at the one-digit (six industries)
standard industrial classification level, far too aggregated to distinguish heavy minimum wage
users. Strikingly, the largest negative entry appears in manufacturing, where only 3% and 10%
of its workforce is paid within 110% and 150% of the minimum wage and where previous work
(e.g., Dube et al., 2010) has found no earnings or employment effects of minimumwage hikes. In
contrast, our study concentrates on the restaurant industry, where just over half of workers are
paid within 150% of the minimum wage. Given Rohlin’s detailed geographic precision, sample
sizes get quite small when results are reported at the more relevant two-digit industry level.
3 In a multiworker firm model, the minimum wage hike would have heterogeneous effects among firms. High-paying
firms benefit from the increased ease of finding workers and therefore might expand. Low-paying firms for which the
minimum wage hike is binding might contract.
4 Like us, Jovanovich and Tse (2010) document evidence of a simultaneous spike in entry and exit in response to
industry-level technology shocks. They develop a vintage capital model to describe these facts. However, their model
still allows firms to freely adjust their capital–labor ratio and thus would not predict a simultaneous spike in entry and
exit after a minimum wage, or other factor price, change. An important aspect of the putty-clay model is the decision of
when to scrap. In this sense, we also contribute to the optimal scrapping and replacement literature (Adda and Cooper,
2000) by aggregating to the industry level.
5 A sampling of papers since 2008 includes Dube et al. (2010), Clemens and Wither (2014), Neumark et al. (2014),
Aaronson and Phelan (2017), Aaronson et al. (2012), and Allegretto et al. (2017). Some of these recent papers use
panel data methods.
6 Mayneris et al. (2015) study exit responses to minimum wage hikes in China. See also Huang et al. (2015).
7 Similarly, Brochu et al. (2015) emphasize different responses among continuing, beginning, and ending employment
matches, which is analogous to our distinctions among continuing, entering, and exiting firms.
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TABLE 1
STATE MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES
MinimumWage
Year State Old New % Change Comparison States
January 2001 California 5.75 6.25 8.7 OR, NE, AZ
January 2002 California 6.25 6.75 8 OR, NE, AZ
January 2003 Oregon* 6.50 6.90 6.2 ID
January 2004 Illinois 5.15 5.50 6.8 IN, IA, KY, MO
January 2005 Illinois 5.50 6.50 18.2 IN, IA, KY, MO
August 2005 Minnesota 5.15 6.15 19.4 IA, ND, SD
January 2005 DC 6.15 6.60 7.3 MD, VA
January 2006 DC 6.60 7.00 6.1 MD, VA
NOTE: *Oregon simultaneously instituted an automatic inflation adjustment.
SOURCE: Monthly Labor Review, January issues.
3. DATA
We study the restaurant industry (NAICS 722) because it is the largest employer of workers
at or near the minimum wage, accounting for roughly 16% of such employees between 2003
and 2006 according to the Current Population Survey’s (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Groups.8
Moreover, the intensity of use of minimum wage workers in the restaurant industry is among
the highest of the industrial sectors (Aaronson and French, 2007). Like many studies before
this one (e.g., Katz and Krueger, 1992; Card and Krueger, 1995, 2000; Neumark and Wascher,
2000 ; Aaronson and French, 2007; Aaronson et al., 2008), we concentrate specifically on LS
establishments, which are especially strong users of minimum wage labor.9
Under an agreement with the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), we were granted access
to the establishment-level employment data provided in the QCEW.10 The QCEW program
compiles unemployment insurance payroll records collected by each state’s employment office.
The records contain the number of UI-covered employees on the 12th of each month. The main
advantages of the QCEW are that it covers virtually all firms and has very little measurement
error. But as is typical of administrative data sets, information about establishments is sparse.
In particular, the key variables are establishment ID, employment, location, and trade and
legal name. The former three are used to measure exit, entry, and employment changes by
geographic location. The trade/legal name allows us to identify establishments that are part of
large chains.11
Our results are derived from five state-level minimum wage hikes—a 17% increase in Cali-
fornia phased in between January 2001 and January 2002, a 26% increase in Illinois phased in
between January 2004 and January 2005, a 19% increase in Minnesota in August 2005, a 6%
increase in Oregon in January 2003 that also included the introduction of an annual Consumer
Price Index adjustment, and a 14% increase in Washington, DC, phased in during January
2005 and January 2006—and their adjacent neighboring states in the early to mid-2000s (see
Table 1).12 Although a number of other states passed minimum wage changes during the 2000s,
8 The next largest employer, retail grocery stores, employs just under 5% of minimum or near minimum wage
workers.
9 In “LS’ outlets, meals are served for on or off premises consumption and patrons typically place orders and
pay at the counter before they eat. In “FS” outlets, wait-service is provided, food is sold primarily for on-premises
consumption, orders are taken while patrons are seated at a table, booth, or counter, and patrons typically pay after
eating. Unfortunately, prior to 2001, industry codes were unable to differentiate LS and FS outlets. This is one reason
why we concentrate on minimum wage changes in the 2000s. Another reason is that there is significant concern about
the accuracy of single establishment reporting prior to 2001. We describe this problem below.
10 We also use data prior to 2003 when the QCEW was referred to as the ES-202.
11 However, the BLS’s confidentiality restrictions do not allow us to disclose the chain names or how we developed
our list.
12 Other than Oregon, the hikes are of comparable size; our results are robust to dropping the Oregon hike.
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weexclude thembecause either (a) the stateQCEWdatawerenot accessible (e.g., Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, New York), (b) the change is small (e.g., Consumer Price Index adjustments),
or (c) bordering states also raised their minimum wage.13 Nevertheless, these five states and
their neighbors contain significant numbers of restaurants along the borders.
We face three measurement issues with regard to creating a consistent panel of QCEW
restaurant employment, entry, and exit.
First, many small restaurants appear to exit and then reenter within a year. These look like
seasonal businesses that are open, for example, only in the summer or the winter. To address
this concern, we define an entrant after the hike as an establishment without employment in
the year before the hike but with average monthly employment above 15 in each of the two
six-month periods starting a year after the hike.14 Likewise, we define an exit after the hike as
an establishment having average employment above 15 employees in each of two six-month
periods prior to the minimum wage hike and no employment starting a year after the hike. We
document how our results vary whenwe alter the size requirement between 1 and 20 employees.
Second, theBLSdid not collect industryNAICS codes until 2001. Therefore, wemust useBLS
imputations of industry for establishments that exit prior to 2001. This problem is only relevant
for one of the five state-level minimumwage hikes that we exploit (the 2001–02 California hike);
the other four state-level minimum wage hikes that we study take place well after 2000, and
thus imputed data are not needed.
Third, firms sometimes group establishments together for reporting purposes. In a multi-
establishment firm, an individual establishment’s birth or death may look instead like growth or
contraction of a larger continuing firm. Moreover, reporting arrangements can switch between
multi-unit and individual establishment reporting over time. Switches from multi-unit to indi-
vidual establishment reporting (“breakouts”) will appear in our data as multiple births with the
possibility of a death. Switches from individual to multi-unit reporting (“consolidations”) will
appear asmultiple deaths with the possibility of a birth. Fortunately, using theQCEWBreakout
and Consolidations Link (BCL) file, we can identify and drop establishments that were ever
involved in a breakout or consolidation. Furthermore, we consider the robustness of our results
to imposing an upper bound of 100 employees on establishment size. Like Card and Krueger
(2000), we find that our results are robust to changes in this upper bound.
Appendix Tables A4 and A5 provide more details on sample construction and summary
statistics.
4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
States might be more likely to raise the minimum wage in good times. Thus, standard state-
level difference-in-difference regressions may confound the impact of the minimum wage with
the economic conditions that allowed minimum wage legislation to move forward.
To circumvent this problem, we focus on restaurants in counties near state borders, as in
Dubeet al. (2010).Geographically, nearby restaurants in different stateswithdifferentminimum
wages likely face similar economic environments (other than having a differentminimumwage).
This comparison then allows us to flexibly control for time-varying shocks.
In particular, we consider the following specification:
Yispt = β logwist + apt + αs + ispt,(1)
13 We also excluded (a)Wisconsin as a comparison state to Illinois andMinnesota and (b) California as a comparison
state to Oregon because of their own minimum wage activity.
14 To take a concrete example, an entrant after the August 2005 hike in Minnesota is an establishment with no
employment in August 2004–July 2005 and average employment above 15 in both the August 2006–January 2007 and
February 2007–July 2007 periods. For measurement of entry, exit, and employment in the period prior to the hike (the
“preperiod”), as our difference-in-differences estimator requires, we shift our definitions of entry, exit, and employment
back two years to avoid using postminimum-wage-hike data. Thus, for the August 2005Minnesota minimumwage hike,
we define a preperiod entrant as having no employment in August 2002–July 2003 and average employment above 15
in both the August 2004–January 2005 and February 2005–July 2005 periods.
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where Yispt is the outcome of interest, wist is the minimum wage faced by restaurant i in state s
at time t, apt is a full set of border segment–time dummies (e.g., northern California–southern
Oregon in January 2013), αs is a state dummy, and ispt is a residual that is assumed uncorrelated
with the minimum wage. We concentrate on three measures of Yispt: entry, exit, and the log
of employment among continuously operating establishments. Entry is an indicator variable of
whether restaurant i existed at time t and not at time t − 1. Similarly, exit is an indicator for
whether restaurant i existed at time t − 1 and not time t. Our sample includes restaurants that
are in counties on the state border or adjacent to a county on the state border among the states
listed in Table 1.
Equation (1) is a generalization of the usual difference-in-difference approach. To see this
comparison, define tnp as the time of the first minimum wage hike for border segment p .
Differencing Equation (1) yields
(Yisptnp+1 − Yisptnp−1 ) = β(logwistnp+1 − logwistnp−1 ) + (aptnp+1 − aptnp−1 ) + (isptnp+1 − isptnp−1 ).(2)
Next, define the state that raised the minimum wage hike as state s and the comparison state
that borders state s but did not have the hike as state ς. Differencing Equation (2) across states
s and ς yields
(Yisptnp+1 − Yisptnp−1 ) − (Yiςptnp+1 − Yiςptnp−1 ) = β(logwistnp+1 − logwistnp−1 ) + residual,(3)
where residual = (isptnp+1 − isptnp−1 ) − (isptnp+1 − isptnp−1 ). As with difference-in-differences, all
of the dummy variables related to time and geography vanish. To account for minimum wage
hikes that are phased in over multiple years, we define the difference between the prehike
period t − 1 and the posthike period t to be two years. The coefficient β is converted to an exit
and entry elasticity using prehike samplemeans (β is already an elasticity in the log employment
regression). The elasticity should be interpreted as the estimated percent change in an outcome
(exit or entry probability or employment among continuing establishments) in the treated
counties relative to the control counties in response to a 1% minimum wage hike.
There are three differences between Equation (3) and the usual difference-in-differences
specification. First, by using the log of the minimum wage and taking differences, we effectively
use the percent change in the minimum wage instead of a dummy for whether the minimum
wage increased.15 Second, instead of comparing just two states, Equation (3) allows us to pool
multiple state-level minimumwage hikes. Third, our approach does not compare changes across
states, but across border segments. This allows us to compare, for example, a change in entry in
northern California to a change in entry in southern Oregon.
Although this county border discontinuity approach is appealing for the reasons mentioned
above, it is imperfect if there are spillovers or if border counties are not similar. Spillovers could
occur through either product or labor markets. An example of a product market spillover would
be consumers crossing the border in response to the minimumwage hike. Similarly, an example
of a labor market spillover would be workers crossing the border either to avoid or pursue the
minimum wage hike. Although spillovers are certainly plausible, we do not know about any
empirical evidence of their existence, let alone quantitative importance.
The other criticismof the border design is that neighboring counties across the bordermay not
form a good “control” group (Neumark et al., 2014). Allegretto et al. (2017) present evidence
that nearby counties are more similar than distant counties in terms of levels and trends of
covariates, which provides some evidence that they would be similar in terms of time-varying
shocks as well.
Although the border discontinuity approach leverages variation due to minimumwage hikes,
it does not leverage variation in how binding the minimum wage hike might be. For example,
15 We also experimented with using an indicator for a minimum wage hike (i.e., define wst−τ as 1 if there was a
minimum change and 0 otherwise) instead of the magnitude of the increase and found similar results.
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TABLE 2




Restaurants Hotels/Motels Other NAICS72
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Exit 2.40 5.27 1.58 −0.75 8.00 −1.98
(0.86) (2.14) (0.91) (0.75) (2.11) (1.12)
16,191 6961 9230 18,184 3634 4210
B. Entry 1.37 2.64 0.78 0.14 0.34 1.21
(0.61) (1.02) (0.74) (0.62) (1.51) (1.26)
16,513 7188 9325 18,529 3606 4259
C. Change in employment
among continuing
establishments
−0.05 −0.08 −0.04 −0.12 0.35 0.22
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.52) (0.19)
14,993 6555 8438 16,825 3324 3827
NOTE: Each cell is from a separate regression. For each regression, we report elasticities evaluated at sample means,
bootstrapped standard errors (in parentheses), and sample sizes. All estimates include state border–time dummies.
some border counties that experience minimum wage hikes have more low-wage workers,
and we would expect to see larger effects in those places. Unfortunately, we are not able to
exploit this heterogeneity since our data do not contain individual wages or other relevant
characteristics such as establishment-level wages, profits, prices, or output. Moreover, we are
working with a limited number of minimum wage hikes. We believe, however, that exploiting
richer establishment-level data is a promising direction for future work, especially as more cities
and states consider or have already instituted historically high minimum wage hikes.
5. RESULTS
Table 2 reports the impact of a minimum wage increase on the likelihood of exit (row A),
entry (rowB), and change in employment of continuing firms (rowC).Results for LS restaurants
are presented in columns (1)–(3), FS restaurants in column (4), and establishments that are not
restaurants but in the NAICS 72 hospitality and food services industry in columns (5) and (6).
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are reported as elasticities
evaluated at sample means.
We find that exit of LS establishments unambiguously rises in the year after a minimum
wage increase. A 1% increase in the minimum wage causes exit rates in LS establishments to
go up 2.40% (standard error of 0.86%). This estimate implies a 10% increase in the minimum
wage would increase, on average, the LS annual exit rate from its sample mean of 5.7% prior
to the minimum wage increase to approximately 7.1% after the hike. Our exit estimates are
statistically significant at conventional levels.16 Exits rise faster among chains than nonchains
(row A in column (2) versus column (3)).
By sharp contrast, there is no impact of aminimumwage increase on the exit of FS restaurants
(column (4), row A) or on other NAICS72 establishments other than restaurants and hotels
and motels (column (6), row A), where minimum wage labor share is lower (Aaronson and
French, 2007). We do find a large impact on hotels and motels (column (5), row A). Hotels are
fairly intensive users of minimum wage labor, although the magnitude of the estimated effect
is still surprising.17
16 Results are also statistically significant at the 5% level for all establishments when standard errors are clustered at
the state-border or state-border-segment level.
17 We should note, however, that those results are particularly sensitive to the choice of standard error. When we
cluster correct at the state level, the standard errors from the border state specification rise to 5.30 (from 2.11 with
bootstrapping), suggesting the hotel and motel results are highly influenced by a small number of areas. For the other
exit estimates, clustering and bootstrapping produce roughly similar estimated standard errors. The cluster-corrected
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Row B reports results on entry rates. Similar to exit, entry also increases in the year after a
minimum wage hike. We find a 1% increase in the minimum wage leads to 1.37% (standard
error of 0.61) increase in the entry rate in the year after the hike relative to the two years prior.18
Given these estimates, a 10% increase in theminimumwage would increase the LS annual entry
rate from its sample mean of 8.7% prior to the minimum wage increase to approximately 9.9%
after the hike. The estimated entry effect is larger in establishments affiliated with a chain; entry
rises by 2.64% (1.02) among chains but 0.78% (0.74) among nonchains. Notably, there is again
no impact on the entry of FS restaurants, hotel and motels, or other nonrestaurant NAICS72
establishments.
RowC reports results on employment changes among continuing firms.Wefind little evidence
of a significant change in employment among anyNAICS72 industries, including LS restaurants,
after a minimum wage increase.
Table 3 provides a number of robustness checks of our benchmark specification (shown again
for convenience in row A). Rows B–D vary the minimum employee size required to be in our
sample from 1 to 20 employees. Of particular note, the aggregate LS exit and entry elasticities
are economically small and statistically indistinguishable from zero when the smallest estab-
lishments are included (row B). Yet, even within this sample, we find economically meaningful,
albeit not always statistically significant, differences between chains and nonchains. That is es-
pecially the case for entry, where the elasticity for chains is 2.09 (0.76) and is −0.18 (0.37) for
nonchains. Once we drop the smallest restaurants (rows C and D), the exit and entry results
become larger, although entry remains concentrated among chains regardless of establishment
size. This pattern by size may indicate the difficulty of measuring exit and entry among the
smallest establishments or, plausibly, that the minimum wage shocks apply in particular to
establishments with a sizable workforce, which typically are chains.
Our benchmark specification allows for state border segment dummies. This implies that, for
example, the Illinois–Indiana border is part of one labor market. To allow for more flexibility,
we also split each border into four equal-length segments (what we call state-border segments)
based on air distance from the southern or eastern-most point of that border and include the
state-border segment apt as a control. Although these results, reported in rowE, are a bit weaker
overall, we view their general tenor as again supportive of the benchmark results—exit is fairly
broad based but entry is concentrated among chains.
Other reasonable perturbations, including excluding 100+ employee establishments to avoid
concern that there are multi-establishments in the sample (row F) and excluding Los Angeles,
Orange, and San Diego counties (row G),19 have little impact on our inferences. Indeed, as a
whole, entry, and in some cases exit, differences between chains and nonchains are, if anything,
more apparent in some of these cases.
Finally, we also computed results for restaurants that are within 25miles of another restaurant
on the other side of the state border. For this sample, we do not have the statistical power
to differentiate chains and nonchains; indeed, we lose around three-quarters of our baseline
sample.However, for LS restaurants in total, the exit elasticity is 2.23 (1.53), the entry elasticity is
1.16 (1.04), and the continuous employment elasticity is−0.135 (0.088), all similar in magnitude
and statistically indistinguishable to our baseline estimates.
Together, the exit and entry results have roughly offsetting effects on net employment.
Combined with the economically small impact on the employment of continuing restaurants,
we estimate a disemployment elasticity of −0.1, suggesting that a 10% increase to the minimum
wage reduces employment about 1%, although that estimate is highly imprecise. Precision aside,
standard error for LS restaurant exit is somewhat higher as well: 1.24 (cluster) versus 0.86 (bootstrap, column (1)). For
FS restaurants, the clustered-corrected standard error is a somewhat lower 0.57 (cluster) versus 0.75 (bootstrap, column
(4)).
18 The cluster-corrected standard error for LS restaurant entry is 1.02, implying a t-statistic of 1.34.
19 Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego counties are next to counties bordering Nevada or Arizona, although the
vast majority of population in these three counties is far from the border.
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the point estimate is squarely in the range of previous estimates in the literature, especially those
that use a border discontinuity design (e.g., Addison et al., 2009; Dube et al., 2010).
Overall, we read the results as suggesting that restaurant exit and entry rise in response to
a minimum wage hike.20 Employment barely changes among establishments that remain open
throughout the period.
6. THE PUTTY-CLAY MODEL
The previous section of the article showed that restaurant entry and exit rise, and employment
at existing restaurants changes very little, following a minimum wage hike.
As we argued in Section 2, these findings are inconsistent with benchmark models of industry
dynamics that allow incumbent restaurants to freely substitute across factors in response to a
minimum wage hike. In these models, minimum wage hikes affect incumbents and potential
entrants indistinguishably and therefore do not generate a simultaneous spike in exit and entry.
Indeed, our calibration exercise in Section 8.2 illustrates that if restaurants can freely substitute
across factors, a minimum wage hike generates an increase in exit and a decrease in entry.
Our first goal in developing amodel is to illustrate amechanism that generates a simultaneous
spike in exit and entry. We have purposefully kept the model simple to transparently highlight
this mechanism—the differential impact of minimum wage hikes on incumbents and potential
entrants. This difference generates “excess” exit relative to what would happen if incumbents
and potential entrants were affected in the same way and additionally clears space in themarket
for a spike in entry.
We formalize thismechanism in amodel of industry dynamics based on putty-clay technology.
When a restaurant enters, it can freely choose its inputmix, so its technology is flexible like putty.
The novel feature of the putty-clay model is that, after entry, the technology hardens to clay,
and the input level andmix is fixed for the life of the restaurant. This puts incumbent restaurants
at a cost disadvantage following a minimum wage hike. Indeed, some exiting incumbents would
remain open if they could adjust their input mix. This displacement of incumbents by more
capital-intensive entrants generates a spike in entry following the hike. The fixity of the capital–
labor ratio after entry also implies—consistent with the empirical evidence—that there is on
average no change in employment among continuing firms in response to a minimumwage hike.
We acknowledge that employment fluctuates within restaurants for reasons, such as seasonality
or labor turnover, that the model does not capture. But we view the model as being useful for
understanding the effect of a long-lived cost shock, such as a minimum wage hike. Moreover,
we think it is notable that employment among continuing firms does not appear to respond to
minimum wage hikes.
Our second goal in developing the model is to have our empirical estimates of employment,
entry, and exit tightly inform our calibrated long-run disemployment effect and other potential
responses to theminimumwage. Because our data only include information on employment, we
cannot estimate the production function for restaurants. Hence, by sparsely parameterizing the
model, there is a clear mapping from our empirical estimates to themodel. That said, we believe
that a richer model would deliver similar answers to the questions we ask of our calibration
exercise.
In particular, we ask three questions. First, are the implied parameter values plausible?
Second, are the results from the model quantitatively consistent with other findings in the
minimum wage literature? Third, is the calibrated short-run disemployment effect different
than the long-run disemployment effect, and how quickly does the long-run disemployment
effect emerge? We view the last question as central, since Sorkin (2015) demonstrates that
standard empirical techniques do not recover structural long-run employment elasticities.
20 We have also used the Census Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB), which collects industry–state–year level
information on exit, entry, and employment changes among continuing firms. We find qualitatively similar although
quantitatively smaller effects on exit and entry in the SUSB. In particular, we find that restaurant entry and exit both rise
within two years of aminimumwage change. No such effect is observed among nonrestaurant NAICS72 establishments.
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This section sketches the key features and results of the model. Further details and proofs
are in the Appendix.
6.1. Production. Restaurants produce food using four inputs: capital, high-skill labor, low-
skill labor, and materials. Capital includes land, structures, and machinery. Low-skilled labor is
paid the minimum wage. A restaurant bundles inputs to produce initial output y0.
Ex ante, restaurants can flexibly substitute between inputs. Restaurants face a constant elas-










where α = αk + αm + αh implies constant returns to scale, A0 is the productivity of an entering
restaurant, σ is the elasticity of substitution, k is capital,m is materials, h is high-skill labor, and
l is low-skill labor.
Ex post, the production function is Leontief, and restaurants cannot substitute between
inputs. Let k′, m′, h′, and l′ denote the initial input choices. In subsequent periods, restaurant
optimization and constant returns to scale imply that the restaurant either operates with its







σ + αmm′ σ−1σ + αhh′ σ−1σ + (1 − α)l′ σ−1σ
) σ
σ−1
if k ≥ k′, l ≥ l′,h ≥ h′,m ≥ m′
0 otherwise.
(5)
This equation emphasizes two features of the restaurant’s technology.
First, a restaurant’s productivity is time-varying. Specifically, once it enters, a restaurant
becomes deterministically less productive over time. A restaurant that is age j has total factor
productivity (TFP) Aj = A0e−δj , where δ is the deterministic TFP depreciation term. Although
this assumption is somewhat stark, it allows a transparent mapping from the empirical estimates
to the model. As we discuss further in Section 8, the exit elasticity pins down the depreciation
parameter, δ. The reason is that δ determines how responsive exit is to the minimum wage hike.
In particular, δ governs how many “marginal” restaurants there are. A high δ implies that there
are few marginal restaurants and so a low exit elasticity, whereas a low δ implies that there are
many marginal restaurants and so a high exit elasticity.
Second, given the Leontief assumption, a continuing restaurant either produces with its orig-
inal factor mix ({k′,m′,h′, l′}) or does not operate. Although the notation allows the restaurant
to use more of a factor than it did in its initial input mix, this alteration is never optimal (we dis-
cuss the exit decision below). Combining the rate of technology depreciation and the Leontief
assumption, the output of an incumbent restaurant aged j is yj = y0e−δj .
6.2. Prices. Restaurants assume that all prices remain constant over the life of the restaurant.
We denote the price of the output good byP. We denote the rental prices of materials, high-skill
labor, and low-skill labor (i.e., minimum wage) by pm, wh, and w, respectively.
We model capital as a partially irreversible investment, which generates an interesting exit
decision. The restaurant purchases capital at price pk and can resell the capital at price ηpk,
where η < 1. This resale discount means that immediately after spending pkk on capital, an
amount (1 − η)pkk is sunk. Because of this partial irreversibility, restaurants do not immediately
shut down after their capital becomes less productive. We borrow this modeling device from
Campbell (1998). The substantive assumption of partial irreversibility of capital investments has
widespread empirical support; see, for example, Ramey and Shapiro (2001) and the citations
therein.
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6.3. Factor Demands. A restaurant makes two decisions at entry. First, it decides its input
mix, which is then fixed once capital is installed. This is a forward-looking decision that therefore
considers the effective factor prices over the life of the restaurant. Second, it decides what exit
rule to follow. For the moment, take J , the age of restaurant exit, as given. We endogenize J in
Section 6.4.
Assuming an interest rate r, discounted payments over the life of a new restaurant for
materials, high-skill labor, and low-skill labor are qm ≡ (∫ J0 e−rj pmdj), qh ≡ (∫ J0 e−rjwhdj), and
qw ≡ (∫ J0 e−rjwdj), respectively. Recall that capital can be purchased at price pk and resold at
price ηpk. Therefore, discounted payments to a unit of capital are qk ≡ pk(1 − e−rJη). Because
a restaurant that initially produces y0 at time 0 will produce yj = y0e−δj at time j , total present









σ + αmm σ−1σ + αhh σ−1σ + (1 − α)l σ−1σ
) σ
σ−1 − qwl − qmm− qhh− qkk.(6)
Consequently, an entering restaurant solves the following maximization problem:
max{k,m,h,l,J }π(7)


















































6.4. Exit Age. A restaurant exits when the marginal cost of producing exceeds the marginal
benefit. The marginal costs of continued operation is rηpkk+ hwh +mpm + lw, where the first
term reflects the shadow cost of staying open and thus delaying the sale of k units of capital
at a price ηpk. Because factor prices are assumed constant and input choices are fixed for the
establishment’s life, these costs are constant over the life of the restaurant. The flow of marginal
benefits at age j is the revenue that the restaurant produces, e−δj y0P. However, unlike marginal
costs, marginal benefits decline over the life of a restaurant because TFP falls as the restaurant
ages.
Because marginal benefit declines while marginal cost remains constant over the life of the
restaurant, eventually the restaurant will exit. The exit age J equates the marginal cost and
marginal benefit of operating:
e−δJ Py0 = rηpkk + hwh + mpm + lw.(9)
Substituting the restaurant’s factor demands (Equation (8) ) into the exit age equation (Equation
(9)) results in one equation with two unknowns (P and J ). The thin lines in Figure 1 show the
determination of exit age of a restaurant for a given product price P, given parameter values we
found to be consistent with the results presented earlier. In this particular case, the restaurant
exits during year 18, as the marginal cost of operating exceeds the marginal benefit thereafter.
6.5. Market Price Determination. In steady state, free entry pins down the market price. Let
f denote the steady-state mass of entrants each period. The free entry condition indicates that
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NOTES: Figure shows marginal benefit and marginal cost of restaurants both before and after a 10% minimum wage
hike. The intersection of the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves determines the exit age. Marginal cost before
the hike is normalized to 1. Parameter values used in the calibration are shown in Table 4.
FIGURE 1
EXIT DECISION OF INCUMBENTS AFTER A 10% HIKE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE
[COLOR FIGURE CAN BE VIEWED AT WILEYONLINELIBRARY.COM]
any profit opportunities will be bid away by new entrants, implying that either expected profits
or entry is zero:
π ≤ 0, f ≥ 0, and πf = 0.(10)
This free entry condition is written in complementary slackness form since there is no entry
when expected profits are negative. In steady state, however, there is entry and profits are zero.
Plugging the conditional factor demands from Equations (8) and setting π = 0 in Equation (6),
and also using Equation (9), yields two equations with two unknowns (P and J ). Although the
analytic expressions for P and J are complicated, their solution is straightforward.
6.6. Market-Level Equilibrium. Having determined the restaurant’s problem, we can solve
for the total number of restaurants in a market. The industry faces an isoelastic product demand
curve with elasticity γ:
Q = θP−γ.(11)






Market supply comes from restaurants of vintage j supplying quantity e−δj y0, the density of each
vintage of restaurant (and themass of entrants each period) f , and themass of different vintages
of incumbent restaurants J . Integrating (12) and rearranging provides an explicit solution to
the steady-state mass of restaurants that enter in every time period:
f = δQ
y0(1 − e−Jδ) ,(13)
where Q is a function of P as in Equation (11), and P and J are solved as in Section 6.5.
64 AARONSON ET AL.
6.7. Steady-State Equilibrium. A steady-state equilibrium is given by endogenous ob-
jects {k,h,m, l,Q,P, J, f } taking factor prices {pk, pm, wh, w, r} and the environment
{δ, η, θ, γ, σ, αk, αm, αh, y0} as given such that
 Restaurants maximize profits, where profits are defined in Equation (6).
 Free entry holds (Equation (10)).
 The product market clears (Equation (12)).
7. A MINIMUM WAGE HIKE
In this section, we consider a permanent but unexpected minimum wage increase from wo to
wn at time tn.21 Such a hike affects employment through both a scale and substitution effect,
sometimes referred to as the Hicks–Marshall channels.
When there is free entry and expected profits are zero, restaurants pass the higher labor costs
to consumers in the form of higher prices. As a result, consumers purchase fewer meals and
restaurants require fewer inputs. This reduction in sales causes net exit of restaurants immedi-
ately following a minimum wage hike and consequently an immediate fall in the employment
of minimum wage workers (Aaronson and French, 2007). This channel is sometimes known as
the “scale effect.”
A hike in the minimumwage also makes low-skilled workers more expensive, causing restau-
rants to substitute to cheaper factors of production. However, in a putty-claymodel, all substitu-
tion occurs through entry and exit. Because remaining incumbents maintain their input mix, the
substitution effect occurs gradually as the incumbents exit and are replaced by new restaurants
that are free to choose the optimal input mix given the higher price of minimum wage labor.
7.1. Exit Dynamics. Since incumbent restaurants are committed to their input mix, the only
margin on which they can respond to higher labor costs is by exiting earlier (or later). In this
section, we endogenize exit.
Let J (wo, wn) be the exit age of a restaurant that entered when the minimum wage was wo
but is deciding to exit when the minimum wage is wn. We rewrite the restaurant exit decision
Equation (9) as
e−δJ (wo,wn)Pny0 = rηpkko + howh +mopm + lown,(14)
where the left-hand side is the marginal benefit of continuing to operate at exit age J (wo, wn),
and the right-hand side is the marginal cost of continuing to operate. Note that we assume that
the product price jumps to its new steady state Pn immediately. In the next section, we show
when this assumption is satisfied.
If σ ≤ 1 and restaurants become more capital-intensive after a minimum wage hike (i.e.,
dk
dw ≥ 0), which is the empirically relevant case, then incumbent restaurants respond to the hike
by exiting early (J (wo, wn) < J (wo, wo)). Exit spikes as all incumbents between the ages of
J (wo, wn) and J (wo, wo) simultaneously leave the market. This finding is proven in result (D.1)
of Appendix Section D.
Figure 1 illustrates the exit decision of an incumbent restaurant, both before and after the
minimum wage hike. The intersection of the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves deter-
mine the age at which the restaurant exits. The marginal benefit of operating at every age rises
after the hike because the market price rises. This rise in the market price, however, is not
enough to compensate the restaurant for an increase in the wage. Indeed, after the minimum
wage hike, the marginal cost curve rises by enough that the restaurant exits earlier than it would
have otherwise, that is, J (wo, wn) < J (wo, wo). In particular, there is a mass of restaurants
caught between the old and the new exit age who exit early. This mass of restaurants produces
the spike in exit.
21 Note t denotes calendar time, whereas j denotes the age of a restaurant.
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Following the spike in exit, the density of restaurants exiting in a given period remains the
same as before the minimum wage hike until all of the incumbent restaurants have exited.
Appendix E provides a detailed discussion of exit dynamics.
As a result of the higher minimum wage, marginal cost curves rise for both incumbents
and new entrants. However, because new entrants can substitute away from minimum wage
labor, their marginal cost rises by less than for incumbents (entrants’ marginal costs rise by
0.97%, whereas incumbents marginal costs rise by 1.03%). This relative cost disadvantage
causes incumbents to exit.
7.2. Entry and Product Price Response. This subsection discusses when and why product
prices jump immediately to their new steady-state level, as in Equation (14) and consistent with
the empirical findings of Aaronson (2001) and Aaronson et al. (2008) among others.
Product prices jump instantaneously if there is entry. The free entry condition (Equation (10))
implies that the profits of new entrants are zero. Because profits depend only on product and
factor prices, for there to be zero profits, a change in factor prices is instantaneously transmitted
to the product price. Importantly, because the restaurant’s decision depends only on product
and factor prices, the distribution of incumbent restaurants does not affect the product price.
This feature of the model greatly simplifies the solution and equilibrium computation and
means that the equilibrium conditions defined in Section 6.7 hold in and out of steady state.
The directed search literature (e.g., Menzio and Moen, 2010; Menzio and Shi, 2011) uses the
free entry condition in a similar way. Furthermore, the model implies a spike in entry and
exit J (wn, wn) days after the shock, as well as 2 × J (wn, wn), 3 × J (wn, wn), etc., days after the
shock. Indeed, the model never returns to steady state. However, this is not a problem because
our equilibrium conditions hold in and out of steady state.
The product demand curve (Equation (11)) then determines how the change in product prices
map into changes in product quantity and entry. The distribution of incumbent restaurants
matters for entry because it determines how many restaurants exit given the minimum wage
hike. The condition for there to be entry following the minimum wage hike is that the extent of
quantity exiting the market exceeds the drop in the market clearing quantity coming from the
jump in the product price. LettingPn be thenew steady-state product price andQn = θP−γn be the
new steady-statemarket output, Appendix SectionD shows that, to a first-order approximation,
market output drops instantly fromQo toQn when





The left-hand side is the percentage of incumbent restaurants that exit, and the right-hand side
is the percentage change in market quantity. If the percentage of restaurants exiting is greater
than the percentage change in market output, new restaurants must enter to fill the gap. More
details on entry behavior can be found in Appendix Section E.
7.3. Chains versus Nonchains in the Context of the Model. The results in Table 2 suggest
that entry and exit are more responsive among chains. This empirical result is consistent with
the putty-clay model for two reasons. First, chains appear to be more capital intensive than
nonchains. According to a survey conducted by the National Restaurant Association (NRA),22
the compensation-to-sales ratio per full-time equivalent employee is 0.26 for chains and 0.30
for nonchains (Table D6). Adjusted for seating capacity, the difference is more dramatic: 0.21
for chains versus 0.33 for nonchains (Table D12). The NRA survey responses among chains are
similar to financial 10-K reports for 22 large LS restaurant chains, which, on average, report a
22 See the 2013-2014 NRA Restaurant Operations Report at http://www.restaurant.org/News-Research/Research/
Operations-Report.
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TABLE 4
CALIBRATION
Parameter Value Description Source
A. Exogenously set parameters
w 1 Minimum wage Normalization
pk 1 Capital price Normalization
pm 1 Materials price Normalization
wh 2.76 High skill wage Aaronson and French (2007)
σ 0.80 Elasticity of substitution Aaronson and French (2007)
r 0.05 Interest rate Standard
B. Parameters chosen to match targets*
δ 0.002 Depreciation rate
η 0.95 Resale price
γ 0.57 Elasticity of product demand
αk 0.49 Productivity of capital Match sk
αh 0.11 Productivity of h labor Match sh
αm 0.34 Productivity of materials Match sm
NOTE: *Targets shown in Table 5.
payroll to revenues ratio of 24%.23 This gives additional confidence in the quality of the survey
responses. The entry of chains is consistent with the hypothesis that the new entrants are more
capital intensive.
Second, chains are likely to be less flexible in response tominimumwagehikes thannonchains.
Chains typically have national operating manuals. For example, “[t]he McDonald’s operations
manual dictates every move made inside one of its restaurants.”24 Because of these formal
procedures, chains are likely to be less flexible than nonchains in responding to location-specific
cost shocks like a minimum wage hike.
We conjecture that an extension of the model that allows chains to be less flexible than
nonchains, in combination with greater heterogeneity in capital intensity in chains, would result
in a larger spike in exit and entry for chains than nonchains. The additional exit would be
concentrated among the inflexible labor-intensive chains, whereas the additional entry would
be concentrated among the more capital intensive restaurants, which are more likely to be
chains.
8. CALIBRATION
Because the only input that we observe at the restaurant level is labor—and we do not have
any measure of output—estimating the production function is infeasible. Instead, we calibrate
the model.
Our calibration proceeds in two steps. First, we select parameter values {σ, pm, pk, w,wh, r}
for which there are well-agreed-upon values in the literature. Panel A in Table 4 reports those
values. Second, we choose six parameters {αk, αm, αh, η, δ, γ} tomatch sixmoments—the unique
factor shares {sm, sk, sh},25 the average life span of a restaurant J , and the elasticities of entry
and exit with respect to the minimum wage hike using a minimum distance estimator.
Although we draw upon Aaronson and French (2007), we augment their calibration targets
to accommodate the more sophisticated dynamics in this model. The calibration targets are
listed in Table 5, the parameters chosen to match those targets are in panel B of Table 4, and
more detail is provided in Appendix A. As is standard with CES technology, the moments that
23 We found these companies, which do not correspond to the chains we identify in the QCEW, by using a list of the
largest restaurant companies published byNation’s Restaurant News (http://www.nrn.com).We excluded FS restaurant
companies, as well as those that did not file a 10 K in 2014.
24 See http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2004/0329/058.html.
25 sl = 1 − (sm + sk + sh) and thus does not contribute any useful information.
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TABLE 5
CALIBRATION TARGETS
Moment Target Result Description Source
sk 0.30 0.30 Capital share Aaronson and French (2007)
sh 0.20 0.20 High-skill labor share Aaronson and French (2007)
sm 0.40 0.40 Materials share Aaronson and French (2007)
Exit Spike 2.40 2.40 Elasticity of exit with respect to w This article
Entry Spike 1.37 1.37 Elasticity of entry with respect to w This article
J 17.54 17.54 Average life of a restaurant This article
identify the αk, αm, and αh parameters are the factor shares sm, sk, and sh. Aaronson and French
(2007) use financial reporting data to obtain sm and sk and use CPS to obtain the share of labor
cost that is paid to workers making above the minimum wage. Since the calibration of δ, η, and
γ is less standard, we outline our reasoning in more detail.
The moment that identifies the depreciation rate, δ, is the exit elasticity with respect to
the minimum wage. All else equal, δ determines the slope of the marginal benefit curve (see
Figure 1). If δ is small, then the restaurants’ productivity, and consequently marginal benefit
of producing, declines slowly over time. In that case, productivity levels are similar for many
incumbents, including those that are close to exiting. Thus, a small hike causes many restaurants
to exit. In contrast, a steep marginal benefit curve (high δ) means that few restaurants are close
to exiting and the exit elasticity is small.
Themoment that identifies the resale price of capital (η) is the steady-state exit age J . All else
equal, η determines the level of themarginal cost curve shown in Figure 1.When the resale price
is low, the opportunity cost of reselling capital is low, and thus the marginal cost of operating
is low as well. When marginal cost is low, the restaurant remains open longer. In contrast, a
high marginal cost curve (high η) signifies that the opportunity cost of operating is high and
restaurants exit at a younger age.
Finally, the moment that identifies the elasticity of demand for restaurant output (γ) is the
entry elasticity. Because price pass-through immediately follows a minimum wage hike, all else
equal, γ determines the change in market quantity and hence output. A low γ indicates that
output is unresponsive to a minimum wage hike, and most exiting output is replaced by entry.
A high γ means that output is very responsive to a minimum wage hike, and therefore a spike
in entry is unlikely.
8.1. Three Questions of the Calibrated Model. We ask three questions of our calibrated
model.
First, are the implied parameter values plausible? We find that the answer is yes. The model
interprets the estimated spike in exit and entry rates after the minimum wage as a small δ and
a high η (Table 4, panel B). Although our calibrated value of δ is lower and our calibrated
value of η is higher than many estimates in the literature, this disparity is to be expected since
much of the productivity of a restaurant is derived from its land and location, which may not
decline much over time. Because both the entry and exit elasticities are of similar size, the total
disemployment effect is small. Our product demand elasticity, γ, is similar to Aaronson and
French’s (2007) preferred value of 0.5, albeit higher than the 0.2 estimated in Harasztosi and
Lindner (2015).
Second, is our model quantitatively consistent with other findings in the minimum wage
literature? Again, we find the answer is yes. Figure 2 shows industry price, quantity, and
employment in the 17 years following a 10% one-time, unanticipated and permanent minimum
wage increase from steady state.26 Because of entrants, the product price jumps to the new
26 The hike occurs at time 0. We aggregate the model’s predicted response to an annual frequency to be consistent
with the data.
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NOTES: The minimum wage rises 10% immediately after time 0. We aggregate the data to an annual frequency. Panels
depict the percent change in market prices for the output good, market quantity, and employment, relative to their
levels before the hike. Employment is employment of high- and low-skill workers.
FIGURE 2
MARKET-LEVEL VARIABLES AFTER A 10% MINIMUM WAGE HIKE
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steady state immediately, about 0.97% higher than before the hike. That price increase implies
an elasticity of 0.097, in linewith the evidence discussed inAaronson andFrench (2007). Because
the price jumps immediately, the industry quantity drops to its new steady-state level as well.
After one year, total employment (including both high- and low-skill workers) falls by 0.8%,
implying an elasticity of −0.08. This short-run employment response is in line with both our
estimates in this article as well as recent work studying the restaurant industry, such as Dube
et al. (2010), Neumark et al. (2014), and Allegretto et al. (2017).27
Although the free entry condition means there are zero profits for entrants, both before
and after the hike, incumbent profits and market value drop in response to a minimum wage
hike, consistent with the empirical evidence in Draca et al. (2011) and Bell and Machin (2016),
respectively. In particular, we find that the elasticity of incumbent restaurant value with respect
to a 10%minimumwage hike is−0.04. The elasticity of accounting profit among the incumbent
restaurants (calculated as revenue less payments to labor and materials) with respect to the
same minimum wage hike is −0.01. See Appendix Section F for calculation details.
Third, what is the timing of the effect of minimum wage hikes? We find that the short-run
employment effect captures only a small share of the long-run employment effect generated
in the model. Because restaurants turn over slowly following a minimum wage hike, the full
employment effect of the minimum wage also unfolds slowly. The employment response grows
over time such that in the steady state determined by the new minimum wage, the long-term
elasticity is −0.40, or five times the short-run employment elasticity of −0.08 (Table 6, row
1). Allegretto et al. (2017) also find some evidence that the disemployment effect among
restaurants grows over time, although their estimates up to five years after the hike are smaller
than our predicted long-run effects and often not statistically different from their own short-run
estimates.
27 It is worth emphasizing that we report the elasticity of total restaurant employment with respect to the minimum
wage. Thus, this elasticity combines the decrease in low-skill labor with a smaller increase in high-skill labor. We do this
is to be comparable tomost studies that, like ours, measure the disemployment effect of restaurant industry employment
with respect to the minimum wage.
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TABLE 6
SHORT- AND LONG-RUN DISEMPLOYMENT EFFECTS
SR Employment LR Employment
1. Baseline −0.08 −0.40
2. Alternate elasticity of substitution: σ = 0.4 −0.07 −0.24
3. Alternate factor shares: sl = .051 −0.07 −0.24
4. Both: σ = 0.4 and sl = 0.051 −0.06 −0.15
NOTE: This table reports the elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage. SR is the employment
elasticity one year after the minimum wage hike; LR is the employment elasticity after the market has fully adjusted
to the minimum wage hike (approximately 18 years). In the alternate factor share calibration, minimum wage workers
are 30% of all workers.
To understand the timing of the disemployment effects, recall the two Hicks–Marshall chan-
nels by which employment falls. The first is the scale effect. Free entry implies that expected
profits are 0, so restaurants will pass the higher labor costs to consumers in the form of higher
prices. As a result, consumers will purchase fewer meals and restaurants will require fewer
inputs. Because the price increase is instantaneous—for reasons discussed in Section 7.2—the
scale effect occurs instantaneously also. Quantitatively, the size of the scale effect is pinned
down by the share of costs from low-skill labor and the product demand elasticity γ. In the
calibration, we use external information to calibrate the share of low-skill labor costs, and γ
is pinned down by our estimates of the entry elasticity. Specifically, the scale effect implies an
employment elasticity of −0.054, or over half of the total employment effect in the first year.
The second Hicks–Marshall channel is the substitution effect. A hike in the minimum wage
makes low-skilled workers more expensive, causing restaurants to substitute to cheaper factors
of production. Quantitatively, the size of the substitution effect is pinned down by the factor
shares and the elasticity of substitution. This channel only occurs through entry and exit of
restaurants since there is no scope for continuing restaurants to substitute away from minimum
wage labor. It is for this reason that the short-run and long-run disemployment effects are
different. Some of the substitution to more capital intensive restaurants occurs immediately
because of the jump in entry and exit. However, as it turns out, this effect is small. Specifically,
in the first year following the hike, the employment elasticity through the substitution effect is
−0.027.
Endogenous churn contributes only a small amount to shifting the timing of the employment
effects. More importantly, the rest of the disemployment unfolds slowly over the next 16 years
as the remaining incumbent restaurants exit and are replaced.
Table 6 provides robustness checks concerning two key parameters in our model, σ and
sl, that are not easily measured. Since much of the disemployment response comes from the
substitution channel, our results depend fundamentally on the assumed elasticity of substitution
σ. We use a value of 0.8, taken from Aaronson and French (2007), but lower values of σ would
lead to smaller disemployment effects in the long run. In row 2, we report one such exercise,
where σ = 0.4, as in Harasztosi and Lindner (2015). The disemployment effect in the first year
is −0.07 and in the long run is −0.24. Although the long-run effect is smaller than our baseline
of −0.40, it is still over three times larger than the short-run effect.
The calibrations are also somewhat sensitive to assumptions about the share of costs at-
tributable to minimum wage labor, sl (and thus the share of all workers who are paid the
minimum wage). As we describe in Appendix Section A, there are reasons to believe that our
baseline assumption of sl = 0.10 may be too high or too low. Row 3 of Table 6 provides one
assessment of how the employment elasticities could vary by setting sl = 0.051, our estimate of
its likely lower bound value.28 In this case, the short-run and long-run employment elasticities
28 See Appendix Section A. Of particular note, Aaronson et al. (2008) estimate a price elasticity for all restaurants of
0.071 but 0.155 among LS restaurants only. Aaronson (2001) also finds a sizable difference between the price responses
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NOTES: The solid blue line (labeled “putty-clay”) depicts the entry and exit behavior using our calibrated putty-clay
model. The black dotted line (“standard”) depicts entry and exit behavior when restaurants can adjust their factor
demands after a minimum wage hike. The exit share is the share of restaurants in operation a year ago that are not
currently in operation. The entry share is the share of restaurants not in operation a year prior that are in operation. In
these calibrations, the minimum wage is boosted by 10% immediately after time 0.
FIGURE 3
SHARE OF RESTAURANTS ENTERING AND EXITING AFTER A 10% MINIMUM WAGE HIKE, PUTTY-CLAY MODEL VERSUS STANDARD
MODEL
[COLOR FIGURE CAN BE VIEWED AT WILEYONLINELIBRARY.COM]
are −0.07 and −0.24.29 If we set σ = 0.4 and sl = 0.051, the long-run employment elasticity falls
to −0.15, or about 212 times larger than the short-run employment elasticity. These estimates
should be interpreted with caution, however, as the elasticity of product demand is pushed
above 1, which is likely too high based on Harasztosi and Lindner (2015) and Aaronson and
French (2007).
Regardless of the precise parameter values chosen, perhaps, as little as 20%–30% of the
employment response generated in our model occurs in the first year. We believe that this has
important implications for assessing the consequences of minimumwage hikes. Using short-run
employment responses to evaluate the implications of minimum wage hikes, as is standard in
the literature and among policymakers, may understate the negative employment effects and
overstate the effectiveness of minimum wage hikes as a redistributive tool.30 As Sorkin (2015)
emphasizes, it is not easy to read the long-run effects of minimum wage hikes off of simple
regressions, so a model-based exercise is informative.
8.2. The Contribution of Putty-Clay to Entry and Exit Behavior. Finally, to highlight the role
of the ex post inflexibility built into the putty-clay model in generating the spike in exit and
entry, we consider an alternative model where incumbent restaurants can reoptimize their
factor mix after the hike. The models are otherwise identical. Figure 3 contrasts entry and
exit behavior of the putty-clay model with this more standard alternative. In the absence of
in limited and FS establishments, consistent with economically important disparities in the usage of minimum wage
labor across the subsector.
29 Aaronson and French (2007) use only data for the factor shares from public restaurants that must file 10 K reports,
whereas our estimates in Tables 2 and 3 of this article are from all firms. As we pointed out in Section 7.3, there are some
differences in capital shares between chains (which are more likely to be publicly traded companies) versus nonchains.
If anything, this leads us to use too small of a value for labor’s share in the calibrations. Using a larger labor’s share
would yield a larger short-run effect but a (slightly) smaller long-run effect.
30 In the model, the elasticity of the earnings of workers as a whole with respect to the minimum wage hike is 1 minus
the employment elasticity. So long as the employment elasticity is less than 1, the minimum wage hike increases the
income of workers.
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putty-clay technology (where restaurants can reoptimize their factor mix after the hike), there
is still an increase in exit after the minimum wage hike if σ < 1. However, the increase is barely
perceptible. Since the exit response generated by the model without putty-clay technology is
smaller, the entry response will be smaller as well. In fact, entry drops. This decline is a robust
qualitative feature of a model without putty-clay technology, highlighting that putty-clay is
central to understanding a rise in entry.
9. CONCLUSION
We present new evidence on the effect of minimum wage hikes on establishment entry, exit,
and employment among employers of low-wage labor. We show that small net employment
changes in the restaurant industry may hide a significant amount of establishment churning that
arises in response to a minimum wage hike.
To capture these dynamics, we develop a putty-clay model with endogenous entry and exit.
The key feature of the putty-clay model is that, after entry, technology and input mix is fixed
for the life of the restaurant. After minimum wage hikes, inflexible incumbents are replaced by
potential entrants who can optimize on input mix. Thus, the model is capable of predicting both
restaurant entry and exit in response to a minimum wage hike.
Furthermore, we show that the putty-clay model generates employment and output price
responses to minimum wage hikes that are consistent with those reported in the literature.
In particular, the model predicts that restaurant prices are immediately and fully passed onto
consumers in the form of higher prices, again consistent with the literature. Similarly, putty-clay
yields sluggish employment responses to minimumwage hikes, with a short-run disemployment
effect of just under −0.1 that likely grows by three to five times in the long run. This finding has
important implications for evaluating the implications of minimum wage hikes, especially since
most empirical studies concentrate solely on short-run responses.
Other models, such as those that incorporate adjustment costs, can reconcile some of these
facts but not others, especially the simultaneous rise of exit and entry. As such, we believe
that putty-clay models could be potentially useful for understanding the response to other
labor market policies, including taxes, hiring subsidies, and firing costs, and we view our article
as a novel contribution in that we provide microlevel evidence on the empirical relevance of
putty-clay in an important policy setting.
APPENDIX
A. Calibration. This section details the parameter values we use in the calibration exercise.
It borrows heavily from Aaronson and French (2007).
Factor shares, sl, sh, sm, sk. There are a number of sources for labor share, all of which tend
to report similar numbers for the food away from home industry. First, 10-K company reports
contain payroll-to-total-expense ratios. Of the 17 restaurant companies that appear in a search
of 1995 reports using the SEC’s Edgar database, the unconditional mean and median of this
measure of labor share is 30% and it ranges from 21% to 41%.31 These numbers are in line with
a sampling of 1995 corporate income tax forms from the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics
on Income Bulletin. Because operating costs are broken down by category, it is possible to
estimate labor’s share.32 According to these tax filings, labor cost as a share of operating costs
for eating place partnerships is roughly 33%. Consequently, we set sl + sh to 30%.
We are particularly interested in labor share in low-wage restaurants. We use the 1997
Economic Census for Accommodations and Food Services, which reports payroll for FS and
31 The search uses five keywords: restaurant, steak, seafood, hamburger, and chicken.
32 The IRS claims that labor cost is notoriously difficult to decompose for corporations, and therefore we restrict our
analysis to partnerships, where there is less concern about reporting.
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LS restaurants. LS includes fast-food stores and any restaurant without sit-down service and
where customers pay at the counter prior to receiving their meals. They tend to be the primary
employer of minimum wage labor. According to this 1997 census, labor share, as a fraction of
sales, is slightly higher at FS (31%) than LS (25%) stores.33 Therefore, there is little evidence
of a significant difference in labor share across establishment type.
Aaronson and French (2007) use CPS data to show that one-third of restaurant industry
workers are paid less than 150% of the minimum wage and are thus likely to be affected by
the minimum wage. This group accounts for 17% of the wage bill in the restaurant industry.
Given these shares, Aaronson and French (2007) argue that the share of costs from minimum
wage labor in the total restaurant industry is likely between 0.05 and 0.10. To derive the higher
value, suppose all restaurants either pay none or all their workers the minimum wage and
also that all restaurants have the same sized workforce. Combining these assumptions and that
33% of all workers are paid the minimum wage, then 33% of all restaurants pay the minimum
wage and 67% do not. Thus, the average minimum wage labor’s share at all restaurants is
(0.33 × 0.30 + 0.67 × 0.0) = 0.099. As an alternative assumption, suppose there are multiple
labor types at each restaurant and that all restaurants have identical factor shares, including for
above minimum wage labor, and for minimum wage labor. Then, each restaurant must have
17% of its labor costs going to minimum wage labor, and therefore minimum wage labor share
is (0.30 × 0.17) = 0.051 at every restaurant. We believe that the correct estimate of minimum
wage labor share in the restaurant industry is somewhere in between 0.05 and 0.10. Indeed,
Aaronson et al. (2008) find that prices rise by 7.1% (standard error of 1.4) in response to a 10%
minimum wage hike, which should approximately equal the average minimum wage labor’s
share in the putty-clay model. As a baseline, we set sl = 0.1 and sh = 0.2. We chose to use a
higher value of sl to acknowledge that LS establishments will have a higher minimum wage
labor share than the average of all restaurants.34 However, we also show results where we set
sl = 0.051 and sh = 0.249.
We should note that these values are for the restaurant industry. Both minimumwage labor’s
share, and also the share of all workers paid the minimumwage are likely higher in the fast food
industry.
Based on the same sample of company financial reports used to compute sl + sh, we assume
that capital’s share is 30% and material’s share is 40%.
The elasticity parameter σ. Aaronson and French (2007) could not find estimates of the
elasticity of substitution σ for restaurants specifically so instead use 0.8, which a review of the
literature suggests is an average estimate across all industries.
Targets: age, exit, and entry elasticity. The exit age of a restaurant, J , is picked to match the
average exit probability of 0.057 (see Table A5): J = 10.057 = 17.54 years. The entry and exit
elasticities are from Table 2.
B. Comparative Static Result: Product Price. In this section, we first derive the explicit ex-
pression for the market price almost in terms of model fundamentals (the exit age J is left
implicit). We then solve for the elasticity of product price with respect to the minimum wage.
B.1. The (effective) product price. Free entry implies that the maximand in (7) is equal to
zero. Substituting in the equilibrium factor demands from Equation (8) and the definition of y0
33 Several 10-K reports of individual restaurant companies show that wages account for 85% of compensation.
Therefore, labor’s share based on compensation is roughly 36% and 29% at full and LS restaurants.
34 Although Aaronson et al. (2008) estimate a price elasticity for all restaurants of 0.071, they find a price elasticity
of 0.155 among LS restaurants, roughly five times larger than the 0.032 price elasticity for FS restaurants. Aaronson
(2001) also finds a sizable difference between the price responses in limited and FS establishments, consistent with
economically important disparities in the usage of minimum wage labor across subsectors.
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from Equation (6) to the maximand in Equation (7) set equal to zero:






































































































To convert the effective product price to the product price, explicitly solve the expression







1 − e−(r+δ)J = P.(A.6)
Combining Equations (A.4) and (A.5) gives an explicit expression for the product price:































B.2. Response of product price to a minimum wage hike. We are interested in the effect of
a change in the low-skill wage on the price level. The effective low-skill wage, qw = 1−e−rJr w,
depends on w directly and indirectly through J , the exit age, because it depends onw. We study
the effect of w on J in Appendix Section C. To see where J enters the expression, substitute
in the definitions of the effective prices in the paragraph above Equation (6) into (A.7). To


























74 AARONSON ET AL.
Then, the product price depends on the flow prices and exit age (J ) as follows, where, in this
expression only, we write J (w) to emphasize the dependence of J on w:
P = r + δ
r
1 − e−rJ (w)
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qkkˆ+ qmmˆ+ qhhˆ+ qw(A.12)
= 1 − α
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σ + αmmˆ σ−1σ + αhhˆ σ−1σ + (1 − α)
.(A.14)
Hence, substituting the factor shares (A.12) and (A.14) into (A.11) gives the following expres-






























The dependence of the exit age on the low-skill wage introduces two additional terms relative
to the standard result that the product price elasticity is sL.
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C. Response of Steady-State Exit Age J to a Minimum Wage Hike. Start with the exit con-
dition for a restaurant, Equation (9), which equates the marginal cost and the marginal benefit
of operating in the period. Everything in this expression except for J can be written in terms of












































































We use this expression for J to characterize the response of J to a change in w.
C.1. Result. When σ < 1, ∂J
∂w
< 0. When σ = 1, ∂J
∂w
= 0.
PROOF. The proof is by contradiction. It relies on facts collected in TableA1. The table shows
what happens to the terms in Equation (A.16) that depend on J and w following an increase in
w when σ < 1 under two different assumptions on J : first, if J increases and, second, if J stays
constant. Straightforward (though tedious) calculations sign the derivatives in column (4).
Suppose that ∂J
∂w
> 0 so that both w and J increase simultaneously. Column (2) of Table A1
shows that the equality no longer holds since the left-hand side of Equation (A.16) decreases,
whereas the right-hand side of Equation (A.16) increases. Hence, ∂J
∂w
≤ 0 when σ < 1.
TABLE A1
EFFECT OF AN INCREASE IN w ON EQUATION (A.16) FOR σ < 1
J ↑ J Constant
Term Movement Movement Reason
(1) (2) (3) (4)













1−ηe−rJ ) > 0









1−ηe−rJ ) > 0
d ↑ constant ∂
∂J (− e
−δJ −e−(r+δ)J
1−e−(r+δ)J ) > 0
e ↑ ↑ ∂w1−σ
∂w




r ) > 0
LHS(A.16) ↓ constant
RHS(A.16) ↑ ↑
76 AARONSON ET AL.
Suppose that ∂J
∂w
= 0 so that w increases and J remains constant. Column (3) of Table A1
shows that the equality no longer holds since the left-hand side of Equation (A.16) remains
constant, whereas the right-hand side of Equation (A.16) increases. Hence, ∂J
∂w

= 0 when σ < 1.
Combining, when σ < 1, then ∂J
∂w
< 0.
The equality in Equation (A.16) must still hold following an increase in w. When σ = 1, the
term involving w drops out, and so ∂J
∂w
= 0.
D. Exit Behavior and Market Price Response. This section proceeds in two steps:
 Solve for the exit behavior of the incumbent assuming the product price jumps to the new
steady-state level immediately.
 Derive the condition for the product price to jump immediately to its new steady-state
level.
D.1. Exit behavior assuming market price jumps to its new steady state.
RESULT D.1. If σ < 1 and ∂k
∂w
≥ 0, then for a minimum wage increase, J (wo, wn) <
J (wn, wn) < J (wo, wo). If σ = 1 and ∂k∂w ≥ 0, then for a minimum wage increase, J (wo, wn) <
J (wn, wn) = J (wo, wo).
PROOF. For σ < 1, Result C.1 gives that J (wn, wn) < J (wo, wo) and for σ = 1, J (wn, wn) =
J (wo, wo).
The proof strategy is to analyze the exit condition. The difficulty arises because in steady
state, the relative prices that restaurants face when they enter differ from the relative prices
they face when they exit because some of the cost of capital is sunk. A restaurant exits when
MC = MB. So, consider the exit condition, Equation (9), for both the new entrants:
e−δJ (wn,wn)y0Pn = rηpkkn + whhn + pmmn + wnln,(A.17)
and the incumbents:
e−δJ (wo,wn)y0Pn = rηpkko + whho + pmmo + wnlo.(A.18)
Rearrange these expressions so that the left-hand sides are equal:
y0Pn = (rηpkkn + whhn + pmmn + wnln)eδJ (wn,wn)(A.19)
y0Pn = (rηpkko + whho + pmmo + wnlo)eδJ (wo,wn).(A.20)
Set them equal and rearrange:
(
rηpkkn + whhn + pmmn + wnln
)
(rηpkko + whho + pmmo + wnlo) = e
δJ (wo,wn)e−δJ (wn,wn).(A.21)
Note that J (wn, wn) ≤ J (wo, wo) for σ ≤ 1 so that showing that the left-hand side is less than 1
proves what we want. Hence, we would like to show
(rηpkko + whho + pmmo + wnlo) >
(
rηpkkn + whhn + pmmn + wnln
)
.(A.22)
To do so, note that input bundles (ko,ho,mo, lo) and (kn,hn,mn, ln) are both on the y0-isoquant
(both produce y0 in a brand new restaurant). Cost minimization implies that
(qknko + qhnho + qmn mo + qwn lo) >
(
qknkn + qhnhn + qmn mn + qwn ln
)
.(A.23)
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Converting to flow prices by multiplying by r1−e−rJ (wn ,wn ) ,
(
1 − ηe−rJ (wn,wn)
η(1 − e−rJ (wn,wn)) rp





1 − ηe−rJ (wn,wn)
η(1 − e−rJ (wn,wn)) rp





η(1 − e−rJ (wn,wn)) + 1
)






η(1 − e−rJ (wn,wn)) + 1
)





η(1 − e−rJ (wn,wn))
)
(ko − kn) + rpkηko + whho + pmmo + wnlo
)
(A.26)
>(rpkηkn + whhn + pmmn + wnln).
Note that if ( (1−η)rηp
k
η(1−e−rJ (wn ,wn )) )(ko − kn) ≤ 0, then Equation (A.22) holds. Since
(1−η)rηpk
η(1−e−rJ (wn ,wn )) > 0,
we need that ko ≤ kn: Following a minimum wage hike, the usage of capital increases. This is
true by assumption. This completes the proof. 
When would a minimum wage increase lead to a decrease in the use of capital and our





)1−α and the sufficient condition is always satisfied. This might happen if the exit age




1−e−rJ > 1). Then, it is possible that
capital use declines. The central difficulty in ruling out this case is that we cannot solve for J in
closed form, so it is hard to bound its responsiveness to w.
D.2. Condition for the product price to jump immediately to its new steady-state level. Under
the assumption that the product price immediately jumps to its new steady-state level, the
output of the existing restaurants is
∫ J (wo,wo)
J (wo,wn)
e−δj y0f odj = e
−δJ (wo,wn) − e−δJ (wo,wo)
δ
f oy0.(A.27)
Under this assumption, the change in market quantity is Qo −Qn, where the market quantity
is a function of the product price.
What has to happen for the exit spike to be large enough to accommodate the hypothesized
decline in market quantity? The relevant inequality is:
e−δJ (wo,wn) − e−δJ (wo,wo)
δ
f oy0 ≥ Qo − Qn.(A.28)
That is, the exit spike has to be (weakly) larger than the change in market quantity. This leaves
room for there to be an entry spike as well (if the inequality is strict).
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Now wemanipulate (A.28) to ask what has to be true for the inequality to be satisfied. Divide
both sides by Qo, where Qo = f oy0δ (1 − e−δJ (wo,wo)):
e−δJ (wo,wn) − e−δJ (wo,wo)




Multiply through by e
δJ (wo ,wo)
eδJ (wo ,wo) on the left-hand side and simplify:
eδJ (wo,wo)−δJ (wo,wn) − eδJ (wo,wo)−δJ (wo,wo)




eδJ (wo,wo)−δJ (wo,wn) − 1




Result D.1 shows that J (wo, wo) > J (wo, wn) so that the numerator is positive.
The condition for the product price to jump immediately to the new steady-state level is
eδJ (wo,wo)−δJ (wo,wn) − 1




Or, dividing by the right-hand side, multiplying through by the denominator on the left-hand
side, adding 1 to both sides, and taking logs, the condition can be rewritten as
ln
{





≥ δJ (wo, wo).(A.33)
E. Entry and Exit Dynamics Following a Minimum Wage Hike.
E.1. Exit dynamics. In the old steady state, the number of restaurants that exit in a period
interval  is
f o(A.34)
and the implied output of these exiting restaurants is
e−δJ (wo,wo)f oy0.(A.35)
The minimum wage increase results in an exit of restaurants with ages between J (wo, wn)
and J (wo, wo). So, the number of restaurants exiting is
∫ J (wo,wo)
J (wo,wn)
f odj = f o(J (wo, wo) − J (wo, wn)).(A.36)
The total output of exiting restaurants is
∫ J (wo,wo)
J (wo,wn)
e−δj y0f odj = e
−δJ (wo,wn) − e−δJ (wo,wo)
δ
f oy0.(A.37)
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TABLE A2
EXIT DYNAMICS, WITH A PERMANENT MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE AT tn
Time Number Quantity Equation #
(−∞, tn) f o e−δJ (wo,wo)f oy0 (A.34), (A.35)
tn f o(J (wo, wo) − J (wo, wn)) e−δJ (wo,wn )−e−δJ (wo ,wo)δ f oy0 (A.36), (A.37)
(tn, tn + J (wo, wn)) f o e−δJ (wo,wn)f oy0 (A.38), (A.39)
[tn + J (wo, wn), tn + J (wn, wn)] 0 0
NOTE: This table summarizes results in Equations (A.34)–(A.39). A  indicates that the pdf is bounded so that,
instantaneously, there is no entry/exit. The  is a time interval.
Appendix D showed that when σ ≤ 1, then J (wo, wn) < J (wn, wn) < J (wo, wo). In the inter-
val (tn, tn + J (wo, wn)], only the old restaurants exit. Hence, the number of restaurants exiting
is
f o(A.38)
and the output that exits is
f oe−δJ (wo,wn)y0.(A.39)
After time tn + J (wo, wn), all of the old restaurants have exited. In the interval (tn +
J (wo, wn), tn + J (wn, wn)), the old restaurants do not exit, nor do the new restaurants. Table
A2 summarizes this discussion.
E.2. Entry dynamics. In the old steady state, the number of entrants is
f o(A.40)
and the output of entrants is
f oy0.(A.41)
At implementation of the minimum wage hike, the market quantity declines from Qo to Qn
and remains constant thereafter. Hence, the entry at implementation must accommodate this
decline. Using this fact and Equation (A.37), the output that is replaced is
e−δJ (wo,wn) − e−δJ (wo,wo)
δ
f oy0 + (Qn − Qo).(A.42)
The fact that the output of new restaurants is y0 along with Equation (A.42) implies that the
number of entrants is
e−δJ (wo ,wn )−e−δJ (wo ,wo)
δ
f oy0 + (Qn −Qo)
y0
.(A.43)
Over the time interval (tn, tn + J (wo, wn)),Qn remains constant, and the amount of exiting and
depreciating output is given by
{e−δJ (wo,wn)f oy0 + δQn},(A.44)
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TABLE A3
ENTRY DYNAMICS WITH A PERMANENT MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE AT tn
Time Number Quantity Equation #
(−∞, tn) f o f oy0 (A.40), (A.41)
tn









(tn, tn + J (wo, wn))  {e
−δJ (wo,wn )f oy0+δQn}
y0
{e−δJ (wo,wn)f oy0 + δQn} (A.45), (A.44)
[tn + J (wo, wn), δQny0 δQn (A.47), (A.46)
tn + J (wn, wn)]
NOTE: This table summarizes results in Equations (A.40)–(A.47). A  indicates that the pdf is bounded so that,
instantaneously, there is no entry/exit. The  is a time interval.
so that the entering number is

{




Finally, in (tn + J (wo, wn), tn + J (wn, wn)), there is no exit and thus entry just replaces the
depreciation. Output is then
δQn(A.46)





Table A3 summarizes this discussion.
F. Firm Values and Profits.
F.1. Firm values. The steady-state value of a firm at age a > 0 with exit age J is given by






e−rj (wl + pmm+ whh)dj + e−r(J−a)pkηk.(A.48)
The first term is the discounted revenues, which reflects discounting for both depreciation and
the discount rate. The second term is the discounted flow factor payments. The third term is
the resale value of the capital. The reason that this term is typically positive is that the cost of
capital is sunk.
Evaluating this expression, we get
π(a, J ) = (e−(r+δ)a − e−(r+δ)J ) Py0
r + δ − (e
−ra − e−rJ )
(
wl + pmm+ whh)
r
+ e−r(J−a)pkηk.(A.49)
To get the aggregate firm value in the economy, note that firm age a is uniformly distributed











(e−(r+δ)a − e−(r+δ)J ) Py0
r + δ(A.50)
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− (e−ra − e−rJ )
(




da = 1 − (1 + J (r + δ))e
−(r+δ)J
J (r + δ)2 Py0
−1 − J (1 + r)e
−rJ
Jr2
(wl + pmm+ whh) + e
−rJ (1 − e−rJ )
Jr
pkηk.
Note that at a minimum wage change, three terms change: P, w, and J .
To think about what happens to the value of incumbents who exist before and after the hike,






(e−(r+δ)a − e−(r+δ)J )Poy0
r + δ − (e
−ra − e−rJ )
(






da = 1 − e
−(r+δ)J ′ − J ′(r + δ)e−(r+δ)J
J ′(r + δ)2 Poy0
− 1 − e
−rJ ′ − J ′re−rJ
J ′r2
(
wolo + pmmo + whho
)
+ e
−rJ (1 − e−rJ ′)
J ′r
pkηko,
where J ′ = J (wo, wn) is the exit age of restaurants that entered at the old minimum wage and
are deciding to exit at the new minimum wage, and wo and po are wages and prices at the “old”
minimum wage, and o subscript on factor demands denotes that they were chosen at the old
minimum wage. After the minimum wage hike, the value of firms is
1 − (1 + J ′(r + δ))e−(r+δ)J ′
J ′(r + δ)2 Pny0 −
1 − J ′(1 + r)e−rJ ′
J ′r2
(wnlo + pmmo + whho)(A.52)
+ e
−rJ ′(1 − e−rJ ′)
J ′r
pkηko.
Note that this is the steady-state formula, but with J ′ plugged in everywhere (since theminimum
wage hike shortens the time horizon) and with the new w and p (but no change in the factor
demands).To calculate the change infirmvalues,we compare thepercentagedifferencebetween
Equation (A.51) and Equation (A.52).
F.2. Firm profits. We measure the steady-state flow profit of a firm of age a as
e−δaPy0 − (wl + pmm+ whh).(A.53)
We measure profits as accounting profits and do not include payments to capital. To get the
aggregate flow profits in the economy, note that firm age a is uniformly distributed on [0, J ].








wl + pmm+ whh
)]
da = 1 − e
−δJ
Jδ
Py0 − wl − pmm− whh.(A.54)
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To solve for profits for continuing incumbents before the hike, we use the notation above;






e−δaPoy0 − (wolo + pmmo + whho)
]
da(A.55)
= 1 − e
−δJ ′
J ′δ
Poy0 − wolo − pmmo − whho.
For profits of incumbents after the hike, we get
1 − e−δJ ′
J ′δ
Pny0 − wnlo − pmmo − whho.(A.56)
We calculate the percentage change in profits by evaluating the percent difference between
Equation (A.56) and Equation (A.55).
The elasticity of value with respect to the minimum wage hike (estimated using a 10%
minimum wage hike) turns out to be −0.0373. The elasticity of profit with respect to the




Exit Sample Entry Sample
A. Limited service, minimum employee size is 1
All establishments in counties with >10 establishments in final sample 61,595 56,225
delete establishments not passing size threshold 51,297 50,253
and delete breakouts/consolidations (Final sample) 40,739 39,769
B. Limited service, minimum employee size is 15
All establishments in counties with >10 establishments in final sample 60,375 55,226
delete establishments not passing size threshold 23,158 23,473
and delete breakouts/consolidations (Final sample) 16,191 16,513
C. Full service, minimum employee size is 15
All establishments in counties with >10 establishments in final sample 54,925 50,122
delete establishments not passing size threshold 21,484 22,081
and delete breakouts/consolidations (Final sample) 18,184 18,529
NOTE: This table reports how three of our key samples were constructed. In the first row of each panel (labeled “all
establishments in counties...”), we report the total number of establishments in our exit and entry samples. To appear
in our sample, BLS confidentiality requires that counties ultimately have a minimum number of establishments. The
difference in samples between panels A and B reflects the counties that meet this minimum number of establishments
with at least 1 employee but not with at least 15 employees. Recall that, to be in the exit sample, an establishment must
meet minimum employment requirements at time t − 1 but may or may not remain open at time t. Analogously, to be
included in the entry sample, an establishment must meet minimum employment requirements at time t but may or may
not be open at time t − 1. The next row in each panel deletes establishments that do notmeet theminimum size threshold
(of 1 in panel A and 15 in panels B and C). Finally, the third row (labeled “and delete breakouts/consolidations”) is
our final sample after additionally removing establishments that are part of a QCEW breakout or consolidation.
TABLE A5
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, QCEW
Average Size of Establishment
Exit Rate Entry Rate Exit Sample Entry Sample
Limited service restaurants 0.057 0.087 31.7 31.7
Chains 0.033 0.071 31.6 31.2
(Continued)
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TABLE A5
CONTINUED
Average Size of Establishment
Exit Rate Entry Rate Exit Sample Entry Sample
Nonchains 0.075 0.099 31.8 32.0
Full service restaurants 0.068 0.095 42.6 43.3
NOTE: This table reports the exit and entry rates, as well as the average employment size, for limited and full service
restaurants with a minimum employment threshold of 15. The average size of limited service restaurants in the exit
sample with at least one employee is 16.7 (all), 25.7 (chains), and 13.9 (nonchains).
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